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I.

INTRODUCTION: INITIAL RESPONSES TO COAL ASH DISASTERS

In 2008, a wall broke at a coal plant in Kingston, Tennessee, releasing

millions of gallons of coal ash sludge into the surrounding community,
leading to widespread evacuations and damaging fifteen homes.' Then, in
February 2014, a pipe broke at Duke Energy's Dan River Steam Station in

Eden, North Carolina, sending millions of gallons of wet coal ash into the Dan

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like
to thank Professor Shelley Welton of the University of South Carolina School of Law for her
excellent advice and expertise. I would also like to thank my Student Works Editor, Adair
Patterson, and the Editorial Board of the South CarolinaLaw Review for their painstaking
editing assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their consistent
support and encouragement throughout this project.
1.
Samira J. Simone, Tennessee Sludge Spill Runs Over Homes, Water, CNN (Dec.
24, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/23/tennessee.sludge.spill/ [https://perma.cc/SJ4CBLLN].
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River before the energy company finally plugged the leak.2 The spill released
arsenic into the river, leading to concerns about drinking water and wildlife
safety.3 These events prompted many states to reconsider their relationships
with coal ash and drove many to reform their regulation of the waste product
and to require cleanup procedures for the hazardous material.4 One such state
lies just to the south of Eden: South Carolina, where a series of law suits from
2012 to 2015 sparked the cleanup of 20 million tons of coal ash throughout
the state. 5
While the coal ash cleanup efforts in our state are admirable, it remains
to be determined who should pay for the expensive process of excavating
existing coal ash and moving it to safer facilities. The cost of these operations
could fall onto investors in our state's utilities: Duke Energy, South Carolina
Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G), and Santee Cooper. 6 But the cost could
also fall on the utilities' customers as utilities raise electricity rates in order to
avoid the costs. North Carolina and Virginia legislatures are already
discussing this issue as coal ash excavations continue in those states,7 but
South Carolina has taken only minimal steps towards deciding on cost
allocation, granting the state a chance to decide where it wants the costs to
fall in the future. This Note argues that, while legislators and public utility
2.
Catherine E. Shoichet, Spill Spews Tons of CoalAsh into North CarolinaRiver, CNN
(Feb. 9, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/09/us/north-carolina-coal-ash-spill/index.html
[https://penna.cc/R2YA-XUP5].
3. Id.
&

4.
See BARBARA GOTTLIEB ET AL., PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY
EARTHJUSTICE, COAL ASH: THE TOXIC THREAT TO OUR HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, at vi

(2010) (noting increased public attention); South Carolina Leads Southeast in Coal Ash
Cleanup: NC and TN Taking Action, CLEANENERGY.ORG: GUEST BLOG (May 3, 2016)
[hereinafter South Carolina Leads], https://cleanenergy.org/blog/south-carolina-leadssoutheast-in-coal-ash-cleanup-nc-and-tn-taking-action/ [https://perma.cc/UKK4-N873].
5.

South CarolinaLeads, supra note 4; South Carolina'sCoalAsh: The Story of a Clean

Up, S. ENVTL. L. CTR. (July 24, 2015) [hereinafter South Carolina's Coal Ash],
https://www. southernenviromnent.org/news-and-press/news-feed/south-carolinas-coal-ash-thestory-of-a-clean-up [https://perma.cc/D2VF-8DCQ].
6.
The cost allocation question is made more complicated by the fact that Dominion
Energy now owns SCE&G. Thad Moore & John McDermott, Dominion Officially Owns
SCANA, SCE&G, a Year After Offering to Resolve SC Nuclear Fiasco,POST & COURIER

(S.C.)

(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/business/dominion-officially-owns-scana-sceg-a-year-after-offering/article_6e6ce794-0e96-11e9-a427-f3 9103ba4 115.html
[https://perma.cc/2RS4-KY39].
7.
Catherine Morehouse, No Chance' on Making Duke Absorb Coal Ash Costs, North
Carolina GOP Says, UTIL. DIVE (Apr.
9, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com
/news/no-chance-north-carolina-gop-says-on-making-duke-absorb-coal-ash-costs/5 52326/
[https://perma.cc/9JSS-5YNF].
8.

See John Downey, S.C. Regulators Voice Payment Concerns in Duke Energy

Progress Coal-Ash Cleanup, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.biz
journals.com/charlotte/news/2016/10/31/s-c-regulators-concerned-about-who-pays-whatfor.html [https://perma.cc/W85K-2R5T].
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commissioners should not completely prohibit utilities from raising rates to
pay for the excavations, a significant portion of the costs should fall on the
utilities' shareholders themselves. Allocating cleanup costs in this way will
incentivize proper coal ash disposal methods as well as avoid the market
inefficiencies inherent in internal subsidies.
In order to reach this conclusion, this Note provides a basic explanation
of what coal ash is, what health risks are associated with it, and how to store
it to mitigate those health risks. Part II discusses the background of coal ash:
what it is, where it comes from, and what risks are associated with it.
Additionally, it offers a discussion of the extent of coal ash contamination in
the United States, as well as the status of coal ash cleanups in South Carolina
specifically. Part III provides additional background by discussing federal
efforts to regulate coal ash disposal and analyzing why state efforts like South
Carolina's have largely replaced federal efforts. Part IV turns from statutory
coal ash regulation to electricity rate setting and the effects it has on
environmental issues, explaining why coal ash cleanups do not fall neatly into
this existing regulatory structure. Finally, Part V examines analogous
situations to coal ash cleanups and how other states handle such efforts to
determine the best way forward for South Carolina.
As this Note delves into the intricacies of hazardous waste regulation and
electricity rate making, it is important to remember what is at stake. In
September 2019, Santee Cooper crews found a breach in one of the surface
impoundments at their Conway site. 9 However, the company did not expect
environmental damage.O Why? Because the pond had already been excavated
as part of Santee Cooper's coal ash cleanup efforts." Improving coal ash
disposal has real, positive impacts on the people of South Carolina, and if its
citizens want to prevent future environmental damage and devastating health
consequences, they must determine the best way to pay for it.
II.

BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING COAL ASH

Coal ash is the waste product that results from burning coal in power
plants.1 2 The substance can take many forms: fly ash is the dry, powdery
version that is released into the air through smokestacks, while bottom ash is
coarser and falls to the floor of the furnace.13 Boiler slag is liquified bottom
9.
Tim Renaud, Santee Cooper: Former Coal Ash PondBreached, No Environmental
Impacts Are Expected, COUNT ON NEWS 2 (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.counton2.com/
news/south-carolina-news/santee-cooper-former-coal-ash-pond-breached-no-environmentalimpacts-are-expected/ [https://penna.cc/Z7MX-3D3U].
10. Id.
11. See id.
12.

GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 4, at v.

13.

Id. at vii.
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ash that forms into hard pellets when it comes into contact with water.1 4 Flue
gas desulfurization waste is the product that results when air pollution
scrubbers capture the sulfur dioxide emissions before they enter the air.' 5
Finally, fluidized bed combustion waste results from a specialized combustion
process.1 6 These forms of coal ash contain a variety of contaminants,
including arsenic, lead, and mercury.' 7 Humans can expose themselves to
these contaminants when they drink water into which coal ash has leached,
eat fish that have consumed coal ash, or breathe coal ash particles from the
air.1 8 Contaminant leaching into groundwater is the most common path of
exposure.1 9 Although breaches like the spills in Kingston, Tennessee, and
Eden, North Carolina, are the most dramatic examples of coal ash
contamination, insidious leaching of contaminants into groundwater is a far
more common problem. 20 Exposure to such coal ash causes many health risks;
according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), living next to a
coal ash disposal site increases risk of cancer and other diseases. 21
In order to mitigate these negative health effects, coal plants store their
coal ash waste product in a variety of ways. If the coal ash is dry, plants can
store it in landfills, which companies often locate at the site where they burned
the coal. 22 Alternatively, power plants can mix coal ash with water and store
it in ponds called surface impoundments. 23 Finally, often in the construction

industry, a company can mix coal ash with other materials and reuse the
product in later applications. 24

The amount of leaching at coal ash disposal sites varies greatly, indicating
that the method of coal ash storage is extremely important for mitigating
health risks in surrounding areas. 25 The EPA has determined that there are two
main risk factors regarding coal ash storage: (1) use of surface impoundments,
also called wet ponds, rather than dry landfills and (2) absence of composite
liners to prevent leaking and leaching. 26 Without a composite liner, or a liner
constructed from several layers of different materials, there is no barrier
besides soil and sometimes rock to keep coal ash contaminants out of the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at vi.
Id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
Id.
See id. at vi.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7, 17.
See id. at 9.
Id. at 7.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss4/7

4

Brooks-Knepfle: South of Eden: Paying Coal Ash Cleanup Costs in South Carolina
2020]

SOUTH OF EDEN

775

groundwater. 27 To avoid these dangerous risk factors, the safest way to store
coal ash is in dry landfills lined with composite materials. 28

The scale of coal ash disposal sites makes implementation of these safety
features crucial. Coal ash disposal sites are very common in the United States.
After mining waste, coal ash is the "second largest industrial waste stream" in
the country. 29 It is difficult to determine just how many disposal sites there
are, but the EPA has verified that such sites exist in at least forty-six states.30
The EPA has formally identified sixty-three "proven and potential" cases
where coal ash has contaminated water in the United States. 31 Some
environmental groups claim that number is actually much higher: Earthjustice
and the Environmental Integrity Project have documented seventy more
cases.

32

One of the forty-six states containing coal ash waste disposal sites is
South Carolina. 33 In one of the largest pollution cleanups in its history, South
Carolina urged its major utilities to alter these sites according to the best
practices described above. 34 Between 2012 and 2015, the three major utilities

in South Carolina committed to moving unlined coal ash impoundments to
lined, dry storage. 35 Part III will discuss these efforts in more detail.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSES TO THE COAL ASH PROBLEM

South Carolina's cleanup efforts began with private lawyers acting on
behalf of local landowners to litigate a South Carolina coal ash site. 36 The
Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) became interested in the case
27.

Id.

28. See ABEL RUSS ET AL., ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, COAL'S POISONOUS LEGACY:
GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATED BY COAL ASH ACROSS THE U.S. 49 (2019) (arguing states,

the EPA, or both should use dry storage for all coal ash disposal sites); Catherine Morehouse,
TVA Shifts Coal Ash Strategy in Response to Spill, Obama-EraRule, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 29,
2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tva-shifts-coal-ash-strategy-in-response-to-spillobama-era-rule/531149/ [https://penna.cc/DM9C-ZRDC] (quoting a Tennessee Valley
Authority spokesperson asserting that dry, lined pits are the best way to prevent another
Kingston spill); Emilie Karrick Surrusco, What a Real Coal Ash Cleanup Looks Like,
EARTHJUSTICE: OUR STORIES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2019-april/
[https://perma.cc/9LD3coal-ash-victory-in-north-carolina-serves-as-a-model-for-the-nation
TL7R] (quoting an Earthjustice attorney arguing for excavation of all coal ash disposal sites, in
contrast with the old way of storing all toxic waste as cheaply as possible).
29. GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 16 fig.3.
34.
35.
36.

South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5.
South CarolinaLeads, supra note 4.
South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5.
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and decided to attack the coal ash problem site-by-site, rather than aiming for
legislation at the state or national level. 37 First, SELC brought a state court
action against SCE&G at Wateree Station near Columbia.38 SELC brought the
action on behalf of the Catawba Riverkeepers in January 2012; eight months
later, the parties settled. 39 SCE&G made a voluntary deal in 2011 with the
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)
to excavate coal ash, 40 but SELC was adamant that this new agreement legally
bind SCE&G to clean up. 4 1 SCE&G was supposed to complete its cleanups
by 2020,42 and it was able to finish the job by December 2019.43 Once SCE&G

began removing coal ash there, arsenic levels in two wells beneath the pond
decreased by over 90%.44
Next, a combination of public pressure and litigation led the Santee
Cooper utility to agree to clean up a coal ash disposal site at its Grainger
Generating Station near Conway. 45 SELC sued Santee Cooper over this site
in 2012.46 Like the SCE&G sites, the parties settled quickly, with the utility
promising to excavate. 47 Santee Cooper is currently ahead of schedule on its
cleanups. 48 It is developing plans to close the ponds, gathering feedback at
public meetings. 49
Finally, SELC began research on Duke Energy after the Dan River spill.50
SELC's alert," coupled with a newspaper report disclosing that Duke's
earthen coal ash dams had leaks along the Saluda River and a 2010 federal
government report finding that the leaks dated back twenty-four years, 52
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Clif LeBlanc, SCE&G CoalAsh Pit Close to Being Cleaned, STATE (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/article 166081787.htinl.
40. Sammy Fretwell, Some Good News for the Wateree River and Groundwater in
Eastern Richland County, STATE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.thestate.com/news/local/
environment/article238543508.html.
41.

See South Carolina's CoalAsh, supra note 5.

42.
43.

LeBlanc, supra note 39.
Fretwell, supra note 40.

44.
45.

South Carolina Leads, supra note 4.
South Carolina's CoalAsh, supra note 5.
46. Andrew Brown, Santee Cooper Developing Plans to Clean up Remaining Coal Ash
Ponds, POST & COURIER (S.C.) (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/business/

santee-cooper-developing-plans-to-clean-up-remaining-coal-ash/article_544c06e0-233c-1lea94b9-ffcde9116688.html [https://perma.cc/C2QB-9K4L].
47. Id.
48.

South Carolina Leads, supra note 4.

49.

Brown, supra note 46.

50.

South Carolina's CoalAsh, supra note 5.

51. Id.
52. Sammy Fretwell, Duke Agrees to Clean Up the Last of SC's Coal Ash Ponds,
18,
2014),
htps://www.thestate.com/news/local/article13927817.html
STATE
(Dec.
[https://penna.cc/X479-8Y95].
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spurred SCDHEC to investigate Duke Energy. SELC followed the process.53

SCDHEC found many violations at Duke's coal ponds, including weak
earthen dams and trees threatening the structural integrity of a dam along the
Saluda River. 54 SCDHEC put pressure on Duke Energy, and the utility agreed
to clean up at the end of 2014.55 In 2015, Duke announced it would also clean

up a Lake Robinson disposal site. 56 In total, these three utilities pledged to
clean up about 20 million tons of coal ash. 57
Upon learning of South Carolina's efforts on coal ash cleanups, one might
wonder why it is the state, rather than the federal government, taking this
action. In fact, the federal government has instituted regulations in response
to the widespread problem of coal ash disposal. 58 Addressing major coal ash
impoundment spills, the EPA promulgated the Disposal of Coal Combustion
Residuals from Electric Utilities (DCCREU) rule in late 2014.59 However,

because of weaknesses in the DCCREU and decreased federal interest in coal
ash regulation, states have taken the lead in this area. 60
Federal efforts to address the coal ash problem began after the Kingston
coal ash impoundment spill described above made it clear the EPA needed to
address the issue. 6 1 The agency began its considerations after the 2008 spill in
Tennessee. 62 However, this process took many years, and just four days after
the EPA announced it would issue its final rule by the end of December 2014,
another major spill occurred. 63 As discussed earlier, this spill occurred on the
Dan River in Eden, North Carolina. 64

Soon after, the EPA finally promulgated the final coal ash rule, the
DCCREU, which instituted some standards but left many individuals
concerned that it did not go far enough. 65 The DCCREU regulates coal ash as
53.

South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5.

54.

Fretwell, supra note 52.

55.

South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities
Rulemakings, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/coalash/coal-ash-rule
[https://perma.cc/8Q2B-8GJW] (noting the various federal regulations implemented).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., South Carolina's CoalAsh, supra note 5 (noting that the state agency was
pushing cleanup efforts); South CarolinaLeads, supra note 4 (calling for state regulators to do
more).
61. Brittany L. Daniels, Comment, Caution:HazardsAhead! How the EPA 's Refusal to
Classify Coal Ash as Hazardous Waste Fuels Environmentaland Public Health Concerns, 27
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 93, 103 (2016).

62. Jacob Arechiga & Anna Kochut, EPA's Coal Combustion Residuals Rule: D.C.
CircuitRulingandAgency Rulemaking, 48 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 374 (2018).
63. Daniels, supra note 61, at 106.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 109-12 (discussing the weaknesses of DCCREU).
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nonhazardous waste-a solid waste at the same level as household garbage
(as opposed to hazardous waste).66 Its status as nonhazardous means the
applicable guidelines are less stringent and not federally enforceable." 6 7
Accordingly, while plants must monitor disposal sites and use liners in new
landfills and surface impoundments, 68 the guidelines do not require plants to
line existing disposal sites "unless they are already leaking." 69 Initially, the
EPA could only recommend that states develop solid waste management
plans, but not enforce these plans. 70 However, the Water Infrastructure
Improvements for the Nation Act of 2016 "explicitly gave the EPA" authority
'

over state permitting programs. 7

Legislators addressed and mitigated the enforcement limitation, but other
shortcomings remain. As previously mentioned, the DCCREU does not
require plants to line existing disposal sites until they begin to leak. 72 It also
lists coal ash as the less-regulated "nonhazardous waste."7 3 Additionally, the
DCCREU does not apply to disposal sites in caves or mines, or to retired
sites. 74 It furthermore allows "beneficial use" of coal ash, or reusing coal ash
for other purposes, which can create additional pathways of exposure. 75
Finally, citizens can only challenge power plants by bringing private lawsuits

in federal court, which makes enforcement difficult. 76
To compound these difficulties, federal regulation of coal ash disposal is
waning under the Trump Administration.77 While the Obama Administration

wanted to phase out unlined and waterfront pits by April 2019, the Trump
EPA extended the deadline by eighteen months. 78 Additionally, the EPA
relaxed testing standards for dangerous contaminants like lead. 79 The coal
66. Id. at 110.
67. Id. at 120.
68. Brian Palmer, Stop Polluting Our Water, Ash Holes!, NAT. RESOURCES DEF.
COUNCIL: ONEARTH (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/stop-polluting-our-waterash-holes [https://penna.cc/X4WL-4N6N].
69. Daniels, supra note 61, 111; Palmer, supra note 68.
70. See Palmer, supra note 68.
71. Arechiga & Kochut, supra note 62, at 374.
72. Daniels, supra note 61, at 111; Palmer, supra note 68.
73. Daniels, supra note 61, at 110; Criteriafor the Definition of Solid Waste and Solid
and Hazardous Waste Exclusions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.

AGENCY,

https://www.epa.gov/

hw/criteria-definition-solid-waste-and-solid-and-hazardous-waste-exclusions [https://perma.cc/
94FJ-JVFM] (noting that coal ash would be excluded from hazardous waste).
74. Daniels, supra note 61, at 110.
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id. at 116.
77. Dennis Romero, Trump's EPA Rolls back Obama-Era CoalAsh Regulations, NBC
NEWS (July 18, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-s-epa-rolls-backobama-era-coal-ash-regulations-n892586 [https://penna.cc/AAN3-KTM6].
78. Id.
79. Id.
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industry maintains that the extended deadline simply gives them more time to
comply and will save them money. 80 Environmentalist groups, on the other
hand, warn that the changes will result in an increase in unsafe drinking
water.8 ' The inherent limitations of the DCCREU added to these recent
changes mean that states like South Carolina that want coal ash cleanup must
take action without the federal government's help.
As previously discussed, South Carolina is well on its way in this regard.8 2
But why would all the South Carolina utilities agree to go through the
expensive process of excavating their coal ash if the federal government does
not require it? Why were they all willing to settle with SELC? The challenges
came in rapid succession, between 2012 and 2015, and the utilities agreed to

settle quickly, within a year or so of initial challenge. Court documents are
hard to find for these legal challenges, and news articles are frustratingly
vague about the legal bases of the suits. It seems that knowledge of past
wrongdoings motivated companies like Duke Energy-SCDHEC found

several violations at its coal ash ponds before the utility agreed to settle. 83
Perhaps, then, the utilities' eagerness to settle results from the knowledge that
their coal ash disposal practices over the past years would outrage the public,
and they are reluctant to bring those practices to light through a court case. No
matter what their motivation, the excavations are well underway, leading to
the present question of cost allocation.
IV. WHO PAYS FOR COAL ASH SOLUTIONS

As states eschew federal responses to the coal ash problem and begin
implementing solutions themselves, they are starting to ask who should pay
for the ongoing cleanups. Before diving into this question, one must

understand the basics of electricity regulation in the United States. The
American electricity system involves many different actors. To begin, electric
utilities are in charge of delivering electricity to consumers.8 4 These utilities
form "natural monopolies," 85 which means that a single utility supplies all the
demand in a particular market by itself because the market cannot support
more than one producer.86 This monopoly means that, unlike in a normal
market, customers cannot "shop around" to find the best product, so
consumers rely on government regulations, instead of traditional competition,
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.

South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5; South CarolinaLeads, supra note 4.

83.

Fretwell, supra note 52.
See JIM LAZAR, RAP, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 3 (2d ed.

84.

2016).
85.
86.

Id. at 3-4.
NaturalMonopoly, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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to ensure quality. 87 This is the point where government agencies get involved:
state agencies set electricity rates-the prices utilities may charge consumers
for electricity. 88 State commissions determine electricity rates based on a

formula that calculates the cost of the utility's investment plus "reasonable
return on the invested capital portion of those costs." 89 Where environmental
considerations fit into this process is one of the difficulties with regulating
coal ash disposal. This question is difficult to answer because separate
agencies handle rate setting and environmental considerations, such as
pollution control and waste disposal. 90
Despite the customary split between environmental regulation and ratesetting regulation, there are still some ways in which state utility regulators
make environmental decisions. Utility regulators have started to expand into
economic evaluations of various pollution-control mechanisms. 91 In some
states, economic regulators consider environmental costs and risks in addition
to economic costs and risks. 92 As government agencies promulgate more
environmental regulations, economic regulators take a more active role in the
environmental arena. 93 For example, regulations for coal ash disposal will
become important as state regulators consider rates for coal-powered
electricity. 94

Given this background, then, who generally pays for the costs of coal ash
cleanups? The answer is not as simple as one might think-these cleanups are
a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, state agencies have generally
allowed utilities to recover the costs of pollution control through increased
rates. 95 In other words, utilities raise the price of electricity in order to break
even on environmental compliance costs. Applied to coal ash in South
Carolina, this would mean that Duke Energy (or the other two state utilities,
SCG&E or Dominion) could simply charge its customers more money for
electricity and effectively recover the amount it spends on cleaning up unsafe
disposal sites. The costs would fall on consumers, the very people likely to
suffer negative health effects from the leaking coal ash. But if this situation
does not seem fair, take heart that a cost allocation alternative exists.
Sometimes, when a "utility has been imprudent," the state agency may not
permit such a cost recovery scheme. 96 Under this model, were a court to find
87.

LAZAR, supra note

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 3, 29.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3, 30.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 150.

84, at 5.
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that Duke Energy was not careful enough in storing its coal ash, it could
prohibit the utility from raising rates to pay itself back for cleanup efforts. In
this scenario, the costs would fall on Duke Energy itself, rather than electricity
consumers.

It is true that this is not the typical way that state agencies have treated
environmental compliance costs in the past-cost recovery is the more
common method of cost allocation.9 7 This seems to indicate that regulations
should not allow South Carolina utilities to recover compliance costs from
consumers. But the recent increase in environmental regulations on
compliance means that it is time to reevaluate the issue of cost recovery for
environmental compliance. 98 These coal ash cleanup cases are on a different
scale than any pollution cleanup scheme in South Carolina history. 99 The new
excavation agreements are addressing a novel problem with unprecedented
regulation.1 00 The change in scale means the rules should change as well; it is
the investor, not the consumer, who should pay for the bulk of cleanup
measures. The remainder of this Note will consider cost allocation in
analogous situations to coal ash disposal in order to determine the way that
states should handle coal ash costs in the future.
V.

COST

ALLOCATION IN ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS

Because case law on the relatively new area of coal ash cleanup cost
allocation is difficult to find, this Note will instead consider how states have
allocated costs of environmental cleanups in situations that are analogous to
coal ash cleanups. Such situations include electricity decarbonization,
hydroelectric power, natural gas leaks, and nuclear power. Additionally, the
North Carolina legislature is already starting to consider coal ash cleanup cost
allocation, and South Carolina has made some tentative steps towards cost
allocation.101 This Note will also consider regulation in those states.
A.

Decarbonization Efforts in the ElectricityIndustry: Cost Allocation
Incentivizes Renewable Energy

One area where state governments use electricity rate increases to
promote changes in the energy sector is state efforts to decarbonize the
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 157.

99.

South Carolina's CoalAsh, supra note 5.

100. Id.
101. Iulia Gheorghiu, South Carolina Regulators Slash Duke Energy ProgressRate Hikes,
Cut $333M Coal Ash Recovery, UTIL. DivE (May 9, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com
/news/south-carolina-regulators-slash-duke-energy-progress-rate-hikes-cut-3 33 m/554453/
[https://perma.cc/2KHQ-2QY3]; Morehouse, supra note 7.
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electricity industry. 0 2 There are several ways in which state regulators use
rate setting to encourage renewable resource use. States sometimes require
utilities to generate a certain amount of electricity from renewable sources. 03
Affected utilities then recover compliance costs by raising rates (although
utilities often spread these costs widely, only minimally impacting rates).1 04
Alternatively, federal and state regulators sometimes effectively build
subsidies for utility decarbonization efforts into consumer rates-they raise
electricity rates, using the extra money on low-carbon electricity sources. 05
Referred to as an internal subsidy, this policy acts as an alternative to
taxation.1 06 It mitigates the problem of "high front-end fixed costs" for
renewable electricity projects, often for projects like nuclear power, carbon
capture, and solar.10 7 Another common beneficiary of ratepayer subsidies is
distributed energy resources,1 08 or technologies that generate electricity near
the locations that will use it, such as rooftop solar panels or small wind
turbines.1 09 Thus, internal subsidies can be an achievable way to encourage
low-carbon electricity generation.
South Carolina utilities may argue that raising rates to pay for coal ash
cleanups is akin to these internal subsidies for decarbonization efforts.
Utilities are simply subsidizing the costs of the cleanups via electricity rates
in order to pay for a service that society desires, except in this case where the
service is coal ash excavation rather than decarbonization of electricity
generation. Money for the excavations must come from somewhere, and it is
highly unlikely that taxes would generate these funds. Ratepayer subsidies
serve as an alternative to taxes in achieving the desired result. Additionally,
companies commonly use this process where they must make significant
front-end investments for change,1"1 which is exactly the situation here.
Excavations and the establishment of infrastructure to prevent future spills
require substantial investment at the start,"' and internal subsidies could
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 277, 279 (2017).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 315.

109. Distributed Generation of Electricity and Its Environmental Impacts, U.S. ENVTL.

PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation-electricity-and-its-environ
mental-impacts [https://perma.cc/KXS7-PTWS].
110. Rossi, supra note 102, at 309-10.
111. See, e.g., Catherine Morehouse, Duke Agrees to Largest Coal Ash Cleanup in US
After Years of Fighting with Environmentalists, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 2, 2020),

https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke -agrees-to-largest-coal-ash-clean-up-in-us-after-yearsof-fighting-with/569699/ [https://perma.cc/FR2C-LTWE]. For example, Duke's excavations in
North Carolina are projected to take up to fifteen years and cost up to $9 billion. Id
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quickly raise those funds. Therefore, South Carolina utilities may argue,
raising rates to pay for the cleanups is a viable solution that has already yielded
successful results in an analogous situation.
However, the internal subsidies discussed above also have associated
problems, many of which are applicable to the coal ash situation. First, these
subsidies distort the prices of electricity, making them less responsive to
changes."1 2 In South Carolina, this price distortion means that once utilities
have completed the massive project of excavating their coal ash, it will be
easy for rates to remain at the higher level necessary to pay for that project. In
essence, customers will continue to pay for a service that the utility has already
completed. Therefore, while it makes sense to raise rates slightly to cover
some of the costs of the cleanups, expecting consumers to pay for everything
is a step too far.
Internal subsidies also face equity problems. Because the electricity
system crosses state boundaries, a single state may pay increased rates for a
certain benefit, while the entire surrounding region receives the benefit
without paying."13 Equity concerns with customer subsidies are applicable to
South Carolina coal ash costs as well." 4 Utilities often cross state lines,

meaning that states could be responsible for cleanup costs outside their own
borders. In May 2019, Duke Energy attempted to recover costs of coal ash

cleanup in North Carolina from South Carolina ratepayers, which South
Carolina regulators disallowed." 5 Allowing cost recovery would make it
much easier for utilities like Duke to recover costs for errors in other states
from South Carolina ratepayers. Reducing the amount utilities can recover
from their customers could mitigate this equity imbalance across state lines.
Finally, other scholars argue that electricity firms now have more
information available about the risks of decarbonization, meaning investors
should be able to plan for that risk, rather than insure themselves with cost
recovery."1 6 Similarly, the conversation around coal ash started a long time
ago. Even though the DCCREU was not passed until 2014, considerations on

the rule began after the Kingston spill in 2008."? This clearly indicates that
concern over coal ash storage was widespread at this point-coal-burning
utilities must have been aware of the controversy. Furthermore, utilities
should have started planning for more comprehensive storage, as it was
clearly the direction the industry was headed-the EPA certainly was not
going to make storage requirements less rigorous. It is thus reasonable to
112. See Rossi, supra note 102, at 317.
113. Id. at 313.
114. See id. at 318.
115. Gheorghiu, supra note 101.
116. See Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82
BROOK. L. REv. 645, 676-77 (2017).
117. Daniels, supra note 61, at 97.
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expect coal utilities to plan for that cost increase just like any other business,
rather than foist all the costs onto ratepayers. Perhaps it is reasonable to allow
cost recovery before utilities could reasonably realize that their current
methods of storage were unsafe, but once it was clear that those methods were
unsafe, cost recovery no longer makes sense. Consumers should not have to
pay for the reasonable costs of running a business.
Furthermore, the same policy considerations do not apply to coal ash
excavation and electricity decarbonization. In the case of decarbonization,
regulators encourage utilities to switch to renewable resources for which they
would not otherwise pay. This takes a baseline solution and improves it,
resulting in a net gain for society at large. Coal ash excavation, on the other
hand, is different. Change is desired, not to improve a baseline situation but
to avoid massive public health crises. Avoiding public health crises is the bare
minimum that people should expect of utilities, not a supplemental service the
entire costs of which consumers must pay. Of course, one could argue that
carbon-emitting electricity generation causes a public health crisis of its own:
climate change. However, no one single utility is directly responsible for
climate change, while each individual utility is directly responsible for its coal
ash leakage. Therefore, utilities must take a more active role in its prevention.
When the responsibility is this immediate, the bulk of costs should fall on the
utility itself.
One response utilities may make to these arguments relates to credit for
future loans. The utilities may argue that if they absorb the costs of coal ash
excavations, then that makes its behavior more financially risky due to the
increased expense. With this more expensive behavior, the cost of obtaining
loans goes up, hurting ratepayers in the future. Whether making credit more
expensive or allowing cost recovery ultimately raises prices more for
consumers is a complicated economic question beyond the scope of this Note.
However, the goal in South Carolina should first and foremost be protecting
the public health, and the best way to further this goal is to send a strong
message to utilities that it will be expensive to imprudently store waste.
Therefore, the bulk of costs should fall on the utilities.
B.

Hydroelectric Power and FERC Orders to Dams: Charges of Cost
Allocation as Federal Government Overreach

Decarbonization of the electricity sector is not the only area of debate
over whether power utilities can recover costs from consumers. Cost recovery
by utilities in general is governed by certain overarching legal standards. State
regulators set the rates for electric utilities, and these rates must "provide a
reasonable opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on [the utility's]
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investment.""1 8 According to the controlling Supreme Court case on the
subject, in determining "just and reasonable" rates, "it is the result reached not
the method employed which is controlling."11 9 In other words, regulators have
a lot of flexibility in determining cost recovery so long as the results are
reasonable (i.e., they do not bankrupt the company).120 This broad authority
for cost allocation has generated controversy in several areas-coal ash
excavations, of course, and hydroelectric power operations.121
In the hydroelectric power industry, which the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) governs under the Federal Power Act,1 22 the government
can require a utility's investors to pay certain costs associated with running
their power plants.1 23 For example, in 1994, FERC declared that it could order

the decommissioning of hydroelectric and that it could require the dam
operator to pay associated costs.1 24 Decommissioning can mean simply

stopping operations or removing all dam infrastructure and restoring the area
to its original condition.1 25 This declaration sparked considerable controversy.
Some argue that a prohibition on cost allocation for dam
decommissioning exceeds FERC's authority because it asks hydroelectric
dam operators to pay costs that they did not contemplate when beginning their
projects.1 26 First, the legislative history of the Federal Power Act suggests that
Congress did not intend operators to bear decommissioning costs because
discussions focused on what governments could do for utilities, not the other
way around.1 27 In addition, the Federal Power Act itself mandates that FERC
cannot change an existing license unless the operator agrees to the changes.1 28
In fact, even Congress lacks this power-although Congress reserved the right
to change the Federal Power Act itself, it noted that it could not change
preexisting licenses.1 29 Because FERC derives its power from Congress, if

Congress cannot alter preexisting licenses, surely FERC is unable to alter
them too.1 30 Finally, FERC promulgated this particular regulation as a policy
118. LAZAR, supra note 84, at 49.
119. Fed. Power Comm'nv. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
120. LAZAR, supra note 84, at 53.
121. Carlos M. Marquez, II, Federal Power Act Limitations on FERC Dam
Decommissioning Authority: Shielding Preexisting Licensees and Revisiting Trust Funds to
Protect the PublicInterest, 27 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 171
(2016) (noting numerous disagreements between FERC and hydroelectric power operators).
122. Id. at 161, 169.
123. See id. at 161.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id at 161-62.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 183-84.
130. Id.
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statement, and policy statements "merely announce" the position an agency

will take in the future-they may not have the force of law.131 Therefore, the
policy should not be binding.1 32 For all these reasons, scholars argue, FERC
does not have the power to forbid hydroelectric dam operators from
recovering closure costs.
Unfortunately, it is unclear how these arguments hold up in court, as cases
associated with dam decommissioning cost allocation in recent years have
settled. In 1991, FERC issued an order to remove the Edwards Dam at the

owners' expense.1 33 However, the case settled by transferring ownership of
the dam to the State of Maine.1 34 Similarly, in 2012 and 2014, a multiparty
settlement led to decommissioning the Great Works Dam and Veazie Dam.1 35

There have been no recent cases in the area since then. Therefore, this Note
will consider hypothetical arguments in addressing the analogous situation of
decommissioning a hydroelectric dam.
Applied to the case of coal ash excavations, one could argue that, similar
to FERC requiring operators to pay for decommissioning their own dams, it

would be an overreach of government regulatory power to require utilities to
pay for coal ash cleanups. Critics argue that it is unfair for FERC to force
operators both to close dams and to pay for the costs when those requirements

were not part of their original agreement. 3 6 Similarly, for the coal ash

situation, state governments would mandate the cleanups and force utilities to
pay for the cleanups, a cost to which utilities did not originally agree. The
requirement of dry, lined coal ash storage in South Carolina is newimpoundment ponds were originally an acceptable form of storage. 137
Therefore, government regulators are altering preexisting agreements and, in

essence, forcing industry to spend money in a certain area. The coal-burning
utilities will argue this, too, is an overreach of government authority.
However, the legal bases of closing dams compared with properly storing
coal ash are entirely different: dam operators reasonably expected that FERC
would not change preexisting agreementsi 38 while utilities in South Carolina
cannot reasonably have such an expectation. The policy statement on dam
decommissioning costs originated with FERC, a federal government
agency.139 Under the Federal Power Act, FERC had an agreement with
hydroelectric dam operators not to alter preexisting agreements, including
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 171-72.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 161-62.

137. See South Carolina'sCoalAsh, supra note 5; South CarolinaLeads, supra note 4.

138. Marquez, supra note 121, at 161-62.
139. Id.
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ones on cost allocation.1 40 The entity that would mandate South Carolina

utilities to bear the costs of coal ash excavations, on the other hand, would be
state electricity regulators.141 No comparable agreement on cost allocation

exists between coal-burning utilities and South Carolina electricity
regulators-just the opposite, in fact. By operating in South Carolina, utilities
understand that state government plays a role in setting electricity costs each
year. Electricity rates change frequently, and state regulators regularly revise
their decisions on what those rates should be.1 42 Unlike hydroelectric dam
operators and FERC, state utilities and state regulators have no expectation

that price determination will remain static forever. Therefore, the argument
that state regulators would be overreaching their authority in prohibiting the
recovery of coal ash cleanup costs fails-state regulators are well within their
rights to prohibit such cost recovery.
Furthermore, there are policy concerns present in coal ash cleanups that
simply are not present in the closing of hydroelectric dams. First, coal ash
cleanups do not involve the closure of a powerplant; rather, they involve
modifying the way in which power plants are run.1 43 When a state government
prohibits coal ash cleanup cost recovery, it does not reach as far as a state
government closing a hydroelectric dam and, therefore, is less likely to spark
overreach concerns. Additionally, the level of risk is different for coal ash and
hydroelectric dams. Dams do pose some dangers to the surrounding areas,
such as the risk of dam breaches and overflows as well as damage to
ecosystems by changing the flow of rivers.1 44 However, the health risks
associated with coal ash leakage are far greater. The toxicants in coal ash can
damage all the major organ systems, cause developmental issues, and
sometimes lead to death.14 Additionally, coal ash is a more widespread
problem-over a quarter of U.S. energy comes from coal, while hydropower
accounts for only 7% .146 Because the health risks are more dangerous and
more widespread, the government urgently needs to act on this issue.
Therefore, there is a stronger policy concern for state regulators to weigh in
on the coal ash issue.

140. Id. at 163, 183-84.
141. LAZAR, supra note 84, at 30.
142. Id. at 40.
143. Coal Ash (Coal Combustion Residuals, or CCR), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/coalash [https://perma.cc/Q2U8-TV2A] (noting that EPA regulations
require only recycling and safe disposal methods).
144. Marquez, supra note 121, at 164, 167.
145. GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 4, at vii.
146. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is

US.

Electricity Generation by Energy

Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3
[https://perna.cc/US4P-N9HU].
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In conclusion, the criticisms leveled at prohibiting cost recovery for
hydroelectric dam closure do not apply to prohibiting or limiting cost recovery
for coal ash disposal.
C.

NaturalGas Leaks: Cost Allocation as a Driver of Efficiency

Yet another area that raises the issue of whether utilities can recover
certain costs from ratepayers is the natural gas industry. Just as with other
public utilities, state commissions play a role in setting natural gas rates for
electricity consumers.1 47 These distributors move natural gas through local
pipelines to consumers' houses, but not all gas arrives at its final
destination.1 48 Many factors contribute to this unaccounted-for gas, but at least
some of the loss is due to pipe leaks.1 49 These leaks allow methane, a potent
greenhouse gas, into the atmosphere, contributing to global climate change. 50
In addition to climate change concerns, gas leaks can cause public health
issues by collecting in pockets underground that subsequently explode.' 5' Gas
distributors have the potential to mitigate these problems by repairing leaks
and ensuring that meters are accurate.15 2

Despite the fact that mitigation measures are available, most state
regulators do little to discourage the loss of natural gas between the source
and end user.1 53 Instead, state commissions usually use rate-setting formulas
that allow gas distributors to recover the cost of all the gas they purchase.1 54
In other words, regulators generally allow natural gas utilities to raise
electricity rates to pay for the gas that they purchased but then lost before
delivering to consumers.1 55 There are exceptions to this policy, however. New
York regulators adjust rates to make up for lost and unaccounted-for gas,
which reduces the amount of lost gas and lowers rates for consumers. 156
Pennsylvania has a similar version of the same policy, and Massachusetts is

147. See Liam Holland, Note, Footing the Bill for Natural Gas Leaks: Why States Should
Limit CostRecovery ofLost and Unaccounted for Gas, 58 B.C. L. REV. 317, 332 (2017).

148. See id. at 319-20, 323-24.
149. Id. at 319-20.
150. Id. at 322.
151. See, e.g., id. at 323 (explaining that public attention has been drawn to natural gas
leaks underground, forming pockets, that can result in large explosions, such as one in San
Bruno, California).
152. Id. at 320.
153. See id. at 319-20 (noting that state regulators permit gas companies to adjust rates to
recover the cost of unaccounted for gas instead of forcing them to mitigate natural gas leaks).
154. See id. at 317, 329.
155. See id. at 329 ("These formulas provide that a company may recover the total cost of
the gas purchased by the company through sales to customers.").
156. See id. at 330-31.
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considering adopting the same. 57 More states should follow New York and
Pennsylvania's lead and limit cost recovery for lost natural gas because the
current system fails to incentivize the industry to prevent harmful natural gas

leaks.158
Were states to limit cost recovery of lost and unaccounted for gas, this
restriction would incentivize distributors to control the causes of the leaks,
which would reduce public health risks and lower the gas costs for
consumers.1 59 In a normal industry, these efficiency incentives would be
inherent in the market-producers would want to provide their product at the
lowest possible cost to remain competitive and encourage consumers to
purchase their gas, rather than the gas of their competitors. But the energy
sector is not a normal industry; it is a natural monopoly, and the normal
efficiency incentives are not present.1 60 Requiring gas distributors to pay for

missing gas themselves would introduce those efficiency incentives into the
market.161 In this case, efficiency means encouraging distributors to prevent
leaks and allowing regulators to mitigate the negative effects of such leaks.1 62
Regulators would simultaneously meet public policy objectives by decreasing
greenhouse gas emissions and avoiding the negative health effects of gas leak
explosions.1 63 Additionally, the prohibition would not count as a
constitutional confiscation so long as utilities still have the opportunity to
make a reasonable return on their investments.1 64 Thus, limiting cost recovery
for lost and unaccounted for gas would make markets fairer and the public
safer.
South Carolina coal-burning utilities undergoing excavation find
themselves in a very similar situation to that of the natural gas industry. First,
state commissions contribute to setting consumer rates in both industries.1 65

Second, both industries cause public health problems without adequate
regulations: gas leaks can cause explosions1 66 and ingested coal ash can injure
humans.16 7 Third, both industries have the ability to mitigate the public health
157. Id. at 331-32.
158. See id. at 317.
159. See id. at 342.
160. See id. at 336 ("[C]ommissions have attempted to replace traditional ratemaking with
alternative ratemaking approaches that the commissions believe are more likely to provide a
monopolistic firm with similar incentives as a firm subject to effective competition.").
161. See id. at 343 (explaining that a capped approach would force gas distributors to take
on the burden of escaped gas and lead to market efficiency).
162. See id. at 344.
163. Id. at 346.
164. Id. at 350.
165. Id. at 332.
166. See id at 323 (explaining that escaped natural gas forms pockets underground that
can explode).
167. See GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 4,
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'

problems they are creating: natural gas distributors can repair leaks1 68 and
coal-burning utilities can excavate and properly store their coal ash.1 69 The
two are also similar in the state commissions' attitude towards their consumer
cost recovery. Regulators generally allow both types of utility to recover costs
associated with the public health problem from consumers through rate
setting. 7 0 Because the situations are so analogous, the same result will follow
from both: neither type of utility has incentives to mitigate the negative public
health effects because they know customers will fully reimburse them no
matter what problems the utilities cause.' 7
Because these two situations are so similar, the solution to the problem
should be similar as well. South Carolina regulators should emulate states like
New York and limit cost recovery by utilities to prevent the dangerous public
health risks of coal ash disposal, just as New York has done for the dangerous
public health risk of natural gas leaks. 7 2 The same incentive problem applies
here. If South Carolina utilities undergoing coal ash excavations can recover
cleanup costs from consumers, they have no incentive to prevent future leaks.
They will not suffer monetary harm from the leaks in the form of reduced
profits, so they have no reason to create solutions that will avoid those costly
leaks. But if South Carolina utilities have to lose profits when they store coal
ash improperly, they will have an incentive to avoid coal ash leaks in the
future. South Carolina should fix the incentive problem and prevent future

negative health effects by limiting cost recovery in this area.
Opponents may argue that this concern does not apply because utilities
are already cleaning up their coal ash, making incentives unnecessary in the
future. However, these companies still need incentives because the dangers of
coal ash do not end with the one-time cleanup of specific sites. Simply storing
coal ash is not enough to mitigate the public health issues-even dry, lined
pits require monitoring to prevent future leaks.7 3 Commissions need to
incentivize utilities to continuously monitor their sites, not just to perform
one-time cleanups. Therefore, incentives via cost-recovery prohibitions will
serve as a benefit far into the future. Additionally, utilities need incentives not
only to excavate existing sites but also to build any additional sites correctly.
And even if these utilities are not building more coal plants any time soon,

168. Holland, supra note 147, at 320.
169. See generally GOTTLEB ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 ("The greatest level of protection
is afforded by composite liners, constructed from various layers .... ").
170. See Holland, supra note 147, at 319.
171. See id at 317-18 (showing that even though customers are freezing to death, these
companies can recover billions of dollars in gas lost before it reaches the customer).
172. See id. at 330-31.
173. See GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 4, at 7, 23 (noting that monitoring is included in the
best elements of preventative hazard designs).
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mandating consequences for spills sends a message that utilities should work
to mitigate public health dangers inherent in other types of electricity as well.
As a counterargument, utilities may assert that, even if regulations
prohibit their recovering from any future spills, states should allow them to
recover costs from the one-time cleanup of specific sites. After all, incentives
cannot apply retroactively-no matter how great the consequences,

they

cannot un-spill the coal ash. However, limiting cost recovery has implications
far beyond this specific case. As mentioned previously, limiting cost recovery
is important in establishing a precedent for the future. Although states cannot
change this instance of spillage, forcing utilities to pay the price for the public
health risks they cause informs utilities that they should curtail risky behavior
in other areas. Just as they had to pay for coal ash leaks, so too will they have
to pay for other crises. This will encourage utilities, even those outside of the
coal industry, to use the safest practices possible. Thus, incentives remain a
powerful tool for promoting safe practices in a variety of contexts, ranging

from one-time removals to lined, dry storage.
D. NuclearPower: CostAllocation ProvidingMarket Competition

One final area where utilities can recover costs through raising rates is the
nuclear power industry. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, increased demand
for energy combined with increased enthusiasm for nuclear power caused
many utilities to invest in nuclear power plants. 7 4 However, projected
demand increases did not occur, and the Three Mile Island incident7 5

damaged public trust in nuclear power. 176 As a result, many utilities canceled
their construction plans for nuclear power plants and, in most instances,
recovered the cancellation costs through rate increases. 17 Indeed, South
Carolina currently allows nuclear plans to use cost recovery measures.1?1
However, state commissions did not permit cost allocation in every
nuclear power case.

79

For example, a Pennsylvania law required setting rates

174. Hammond & Rossi, supra note 116, at 653.
175. See Marie Cusick, Forty Years After a Partial Nuclear Meltdown, a New Push to
Keep Three Mile Island Open, NPR (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/28/707
000226/40-years-after-a-partial-nuclear-meltdown-a-new-push-to-keep-three-mile-island-o
[https://perma.cc/2MFV-D92C]. In March 1979, a reactor in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant
in Pennsylvania had a partial meltdown when a water pump malfunctioned. Id. Although only a
small amount of radiation was actually released, widespread fear caused thousands of people to
flee the area. Id. The remaining functioning reactor reopened in 1985, and although it has been
losing money, many want it to remain open to continue to provide zero-emission power. Id.
176. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 116, at 653 ("Three Mile Island prompted
concerns about the safety of nuclear power. . . .").
177. See id.
178. See id. at 670.
179. See id. at 654.
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without consideration of spending on generation facilities that a utility
planned but did not build, even if the expenditures were prudent at the time.1 80
In

Duquesne Light Co. v.

Barasch, the

Supreme

Court held

that

Pennsylvania's policy was permissible and did not violate the Takings Clause
of the Constitution,' 8' drawing heavily on Hope's holding that the
Constitution protects the net effect of rates, not the formula for setting rates. 8 2
It expressly declined to mandate rate setting based on "prudent investment,"
noting that this would be contrary to the Court's position against mandating a
single rate-making formula. 83 It did place a limitation by noting that states
cannot switch arbitrarily between formulas for rate setting, but the Court held
that Pennsylvania had done no such thing.18 4
Duquesne indicates that South Carolina would prevail in any Takings

Clause challenges should the state decide to prohibit cost allocation for coal
ash excavations, so long as it did not change its formula arbitrarily.1 85 Just
because regulators once considered wet impoundments to be safe storage
structures does not mean they must continue to permit cost recovery. In

Duquesne, the court held that regulators could deny cost recovery for nuclear
generation that ended up producing zero electricity, even if the regulators
found the utilities' decision was prudent at the time.1 86 Similarly, regulators
should deny cost recovery for coal ash storage because, although they once
considered it prudent, regulators now realized that it is unsafe. The past
designation of prudency does not necessarily lead to the current allowance of
cost recovery. All South Carolina must do is apply this formula consistently.
Although utilities continue to use cost recovery in South Carolina, that
may be changing as many claim it no longer makes sense. Some argue that
the cost recovery in previous decades was acceptable because utilities built
nuclear plants largely due to encouragement from regulators to increase
electricity generation.187 Additionally, investors may not have paid for the
new plants without the assurance that consumers would pay for risks.1 88
However, the "insurance" that customers provided against risk probably
encouraged utilities to overinvest in new nuclear power plants-insulated
180. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 299-300 (1989) (showing that cost
will only be recoverable in the rate base once the facility actually becomes "used and useful").
181. See id.
182. Id. (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas. Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
183. See id. at 315.
184. See id. (noting that switching back and forth without good reason might cause
investors to bear the risk of bad investments sometimes while not getting the benefit of good
investments at others, raising constitutional questions).
185. See id. at 299, 315.
186. See id. at 299-300.
187. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 116, at 653 ("[T]he regulatory process encouraged
investment in large base load power generation plants.").
188. See id. at 654-55.
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from costs, utilities built more plants than necessary, exacerbating the
oversupply.1 89 Additionally, costs fell on consumers for something that was
not their fault, but rather the utilities' fault.1 90 While permitting cost recovery
allowed for the production of new electricity generation, it also had several
drawbacks.
Just as it was for nuclear power, allowing cost recovery is sometimes
necessary to convince utilities to make risky but important changes that a
normal company might not wish to undertake.191 However, the issues with
cost recovery in the nuclear industry indicate some problems with cost
recovery overall. First, the expectation that utilities can recover costs leads
those companies to overstate the financial burden that new regulations will
place on them.1 92 In other words, utilities will use newly implemented
regulations against the commissions as a way to justify raising rates. Second,
consumers should not be responsible for ordinary business risks that utilities
face.19' It is true that utilities cannot control regulatory changes, making it
seem unfair for them to pay for these changes themselves.1 94 However, there
are many risks that utilities can control, the same as any other company, and
consumers should not be responsible for the costs of these risks.1 95 Finally,
utilities and regulators often ignore the positive effects of regulations when
setting rates for cost recovery, such as benefits regulatory changes could have
on utilities' business and on society more broadly.1 96 Therefore, cost recovery
can lead to many negative effects in the nuclear power sector.
Just as it was for the natural gas industry, the nuclear utility situation is
analogous to the coal ash excavation situation. For both nuclear and coalburning plants, utilities made significant investments in a type of power
generation that seemed like a good idea at the time-nuclear power companies
building more nuclear power plants in the face of increased demand1 97 and
coal-burning powerplants capitalizing on the cheap storage of coal to meet

electricity demand. Then, as time went on, costs ended up being higher than
either type of utility had anticipated. For the nuclear industry, the costs were
due to plant cancellations.1 98 For coal-burning powerplants, on the other hand,
189. See id.
190. See id. at 653 ("On the other hand, allowing full cost recovery for every loss a firm
would incur due to mistaken investment decisions would unfairly burden customers .... ").
191. See id. at 650.
192. Id. at 661.
193. See id. at 662.
194. See id.; see also id at 652 ("Regulators determining stranded costs in this manner did
a poor job of separating the ordinary economic and technological risks that any business investor
would expect, from regulatory risks over which firms have little or no control.").
195. See id. at 662.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 652-53.
198. See id.
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the costs are due to newly raised standards in coal ash containment as South
Carolina starts to require cleanups and storage in dry, lined pits. Both of these
cases share a critical timing element: the cost recovery decisions were made
after the projects were approved and deemed prudent by regulatory bodies.1 99
Thus, the nuclear industry and coal-burning power plants find themselves in
very similar situations.
Because the two situations are so similar, the same policy concerns
associated with cost recovery for prematurely closed nuclear sites apply to
cost recovery for coal ash cleanups. One such concern lies in setting rates
appropriately. When deciding how to set high rates in order to pay for coal
ash excavation, South Carolina utilities will have the incentive to exaggerate
in order to recover more money. The more expensive they say the cleanups
are, the more money they can get from consumers. This will make it hard to
determine what the reasonable rate should be.
Additionally, consumers should not be responsible for the mistakes of the
industry. Utilities may argue that they could not plan for the regulatory
changes around coal ash disposal. However, coal ash spills from wet
impoundments have been happening for several years-the famous Eden,
North Carolina, spill occurred in 2014,200 and the Kingston, Tennessee, spill
occurred in 2008 2 01-other coal plants should have recognized the danger of
wet impoundments and mitigated the risk in the meantime. Customers should
suffer the penalties for this failure; any other business would be responsible
for failing to respond to changes in this way, and coal-burning utilities should
answer for their failures too.
Finally, if rate setting is to take into account the costs of the excavations,
it should take into account the benefits of such cleanups as well. Looking only
at financial impacts on investors when setting rates ignores broader
benefits. 20 2 The excavations may be expensive at the time, but they will reduce
other costs for utilities in the future. For example, Duke Energy has paid over
$1.36 million to North Carolina and the federal government for restoration
after the Dan River spill. 20 3 If coal-burning utilities store coal ash safely, they

can avoid restoration costs like this in the future, benefitting their businesses.
Focusing only on the immediate costs of the excavations ignores the potential
for these kinds of future savings.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 654.
See Shoichet, supra note 2.
Id.
See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 116, at 663.

203. See John Downey, Court Action Involving Duke Energy Marks Step Forward in

Winding Down Coal-Ash Work at Dan River, CHARLOTTE Bus. J. (Jul. 19, 2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2019/07/19/court-action-involving-duke-energymarks-step.html [https://perma.cc/P52L-VVKV].
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Therefore, even though South Carolina mandated these costs after state
regulators determined current impoundment storage was acceptable, allowing
total recovery of compliance costs would yield many negative consequences.
For one thing, setting rates appropriately would be a difficult task. But more
importantly, states should not totally insulate utilities from risks-they are
still companies and, as such, must bear the risks associated with running a
normal business.
E.

North Carolinaand South CarolinaLegislation on Coal Ash: First
Steps Towards CostAllocation Policy

Most legislation governing the cost allocation of coal ash disposal has
taken place only in North Carolina, with the North Carolina Public Utilities
Commission and the North Carolina House of Representatives weighing in.
While South Carolina legislators have also taken certain steps, they still need
to make many decisions regarding cost allocation. However, there has been
some resistance in both states towards allowing utilities to recover all costs
for the cleanups.
So far, North Carolina has proved hesitant to allow cost recovery. This
reflects the fact that a 2017 poll from a renewable advocacy group reported
that more than 80% of North Carolinians want Duke Energy itself to pay coal
ash excavation costs (although a Duke spokesman argued the surveyors used
biased language in writing the question). 20 4 Despite this, North Carolina has
allowed some cost recovery. In 2018, the North Carolina Public Utilities
Commission allowed Duke to raise customers' fixed monthly charges by 25%,
as well as increase rates to $232 million, to pay for coal ash excavations. 205
However, this decision does not favor Duke as much as it seems. Duke
originally asked to recover much more-$477.5 million. 206 The Commission
also fined Duke millions of dollars for mismanagement of the cleanups and
prohibited it from recovering costs of ongoing cleanups, leaving that to the
next general rate case. 207 Additionally, the Commission included strong
language indicating its displeasure with how Duke's actions had

204. Robert Walton, Most North CarolinaResidents Don't Want Duke to Chargefor Coal
Ash Cleanup, Survey Says, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/most-north-carolina-residents-dont-want-duke-to-charge-for-coal-ash-cleanu/43 8564/
[https://penna.cc/2889-B48A].
205. Robert Walton, Duke's North Carolina Customers Will Pay $232Mfor Coal Ash
Cleanup, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/dukes-north-carolinacustomers-will-pay-232m-for-coal-ash-cleanup/517879/ [https://perna.cc/F93T-NUVT].
206. Id.
207. Id.
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impermissibly put North Carolinians at risk.208 For example, the Commission
wrote that Duke's handling of coal ash "placed its customers at risk of
inadequate or unreasonably expensive service" and that Duke "admits to
pervasive, system-wide

shortcomings such as improper communication

among those responsible for oversight of coal ash management." 20 9 All in all,
the Commission is clearly displeased with the utility, indicating that degree of
fault has played a role in determining whether it should allow utilities to
allocate costs. Of course, it remains to be seen how the next general rate case
will handle cost recovery.
Moving from the public utilities commission to the legislature, North
Carolina's treatment of cost recovery is mostly in limbo in the house and
senate. As of 2019, the North Carolina legislature is considering a bill that
would prohibit Duke from raising rates to pay for coal ash cleanups in the
state. 210 In general, Democrats support the bill, arguing that Duke should be
responsible for its own pollution. 211Republicans, on the other hand, generally
oppose the bill, arguing ratepayers benefitted from the cheaply stored coal ash
and now should help pay for the consequences of those low prices. 212 The bill
needs significant bipartisan support in order to pass, and many believe this is
unlikely in the Republican-controlled legislature. 213
The legislature decided on an issue tangentially related to coal ash costs,
however. Another 2019 bill would have allowed Duke to set rates for up to
five years at a time, instead of a year at a time, as it is now. 214 Many worried
that allowing Duke to consult with state regulators on rates less often would
make it easier for Duke to insert coal ash cost recovery into its rates. 215
However, the bill was rejected in the House with very little discussion;
legislators wanted to obtain additional input from stakeholders before it made
such a drastic change in the way Duke interacts with state regulators.2 16 The
defeat of this bill indicates that the state is at least wary of Duke's ambitions
regarding cost recovery.
208. See Robert Walton, North Carolina Regulators Issue Rare Rebuke to Duke
with Rate Denial, UTIL. DIVE (June 25, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/north-

carolina-regulators-issue-rare-rebuke-to-duke-with-rate-denial/526426/

[https://perma.cc/

5WZF-4VZR].
209. Id.
210. Morehouse, supra note 7.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Catherine Morehouse,
Controversial Duke Multiyear Rate Plan
Upended in North Carolina House, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.utility
dive.com/news/controversial-duke-multiyear-rate-plan-stalls-in-north-carolina-house/561464/
[https://perna.cc/HKN5-NSQX].
215. See id.
216. See id.
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Turning to South Carolina, our state has indicated a similar disposition
towards cost recovery, although the conversation between Duke and the
state's public utility commission is ongoing. In May 2019, South Carolina

regulators cut Duke's rate hike proposal by 30% and disallowed $333 million
of coal ash recovery from North Carolina. 217 Duke is currently seeking a
rehearing on these cuts. 218 So far, there does not seem to be any discussion of

cost recovery in the South Carolina legislature. It remains to be seen how the
public utility commission and lawmakers will address this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the coming years, there are two main arenas in which South Carolina
will determine its position on cost allocation: the South Carolina Public
Service Commission (PSC) and the South Carolina legislature. The PSC has
the potential to set rates in a way that limits cost allocation on its own. The
legislature, meanwhile, has the potential to pass laws directing the PSC to
limit cost allocation, similar to the North Carolina House bill. If North
Carolina's approach serves any indication, though, it is more likely that action
will come from the PSC rather than the legislature. Indeed, Duke Energy is
already seeking a rehearing on recent rate cuts, which will force the PSC to
decide the issue. 219

South Carolina's PSC is made up of seven commissioners representing
various districts: a chairman, a vice chairman, and five others. 220 Three
recently elected commissioners have shown a new level of skepticism towards
the electric utilities, with Commissioner Tom Ervin telling Duke: "We are not
going to be a rubber stamp. If that has been the historic practice, that's
over." 22 1 This change comes at a time of general distrust of utilities in South
Carolina, and with good reason: according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, our state has the third-highest average residential power costs
in the nation. 222 Clearly, the state's PSC will not allow South Carolina utilities
to raise rates without a good justification, and, as this Note has shown, little
217. Gheorghiu, supra note 101.
218. Iulia Gheorghiu, Duke CEO PressesCase Against N. C. CoalAsh Excavation Order,
S.C. Rate Ruling, UTIL. DIVE (May 10, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-ceo-

presses-case-against-nc-coal-ash-excavation-order-sc-rate-rul/5 54495/ [https://perma.cc/M45JLGQ9].
219. See id.
220. Commissioners, S.C. PUB. SERV. COMMISSION, https://psc.sc.gov/about-us0/commissioners [https://penna.cc/ZM2B-G3DK].
221. Andrew Brown, Utility CEO "Disappointed"That SC Regulatory Environment Has
Changed, POST & COURIER (S.C.) (May 11, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/business/
utility-ceo-disappointed-that-sc-regulatory-environment-has-changed/article_327601a6-728411e9-8e0b-637703829f36.html [https://perma.cc/3R42-463Q].
222. See id.
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justification exists for allowing extensive cost allocation for coal ash
excavations.

PSC regulators should prohibit cost recovery on the basis of relative
degree of fault. Reducing the amount that utilities can recover would have
several beneficial effects on South Carolina. First, it would avoid the market
inefficiencies inherent in cost recovery, such as making prices less responsive
to market conditions. Additionally, it would incentivize utilities to be more
careful in storing waste because they know cleanups will be expensive in the
future. For these reasons, the PSC should limit cost recovery.
The utilities' main counterargument will likely be that they should not be
financially responsible for changes in regulations. They have a special status
as government-regulated businesses and should not be penalized for decisions
of the government over which they have no control. And, to a certain extent,
the utilities are correct on this point. When they have no way of knowing what
the government is going to do, they should not be responsible for the changes
the government makes. In that case, cost allocation is a perfectly reasonable
way to compensate utilities. The people of South Carolina, through the state
government, placed a burden on them, and therefore the people of South
Carolina should pay for it. However, it is a different story when the utility
should reasonably know an activity is imprudent. In that case, utilities should
understand that regulators will require them to cease the imprudent activity,
just as any normal business would understand that customers will no longer
patronize them if their service is dangerous. The only difference is that normal
businesses are regulated by market competition, while utilities are regulated
by the government. Utilities should know that the government will prevent
them from taking imprudent actions, and they are therefore financially
responsible for deciding to take those actions anyways.
Coal ash excavations should be held to this standard. Coal-burning
utilities should be allowed to recover costs for coal ash storage before they
knew wet storage was dangerous. At that point, they could not predict that the
government would one day require them to change their storage practices. But

once the danger of unlined impoundment ponds became clear, and they took
unsafe actions anyways, they must be held responsible. At that point, any
reasonable utility should understand that they will be required to update to the
safe method in the future and prepare for that eventuality. Therefore, the South
Carolina PSC should prohibit cost recovery for imprudent utility actions.
Of course, it would be difficult to take individual utility actions one at a
time from the beginning of coal ash storage and determine whether or not they
are prudent. An easier alternative could be based on time. For instance, the
PSC could pick a date after which it was unreasonable to continue wet
impoundment storage of coal ash. Utilities could recover costs for actions
taken before that date, but not for actions taken after that date. Limiting
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recovery in this way would preserve the benefits of limiting cost recovery
while addressing the concerns of utilities. It ensures that utilities do not benefit
from knowingly using unsafe practices.
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